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Abstract 
We exploit a natural experiment provided by the 1999 introduction of the UK National 
Minimum Wage (NMW) to investigate the relationship between wages and monitoring and to 
test for Efficiency Wages considerations in a low-wage sector, the UK residential care homes 
industry. Our findings seem to support the wage-supervision trade-off prediction of the 
shirking model, and that employers didn’t dissipate minimum wage rents by increasing work 
intensity or effort requirements on the job. Estimation results suggest that higher wage costs 
were more than offset by lower monitoring costs, and thus the overall evidence imply that the 
NMW may have operated as an Efficiency Wage. These findings support Efficiency Wage 
models used to explain a non-negative employment effect of the Minimum Wage and provide 
an explanation of recent evidence from the care homes sector that although the wage structure 
was heavily affected by the NMW introduction, there were moderate employment effects. 
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1 Introduction
Efficiency Wages theory has been used to explain downward wage rigidity at
the microeconomic level (Weiss, 1991) and thus involuntary unemployment as
well as labour market segmentation (Bulow and Summers, 1986) and wage dif-
ferentials across firms or industries (Krueger and Summers, 1988).
The essence of the theory is that wages do not only determine employment
but also affect employees’ productive behavior or quality1 , and that is why,
under certain conditions, it is optimal for employers to set compensation above
the market clearing level in order to recruit, retain or motivate employees.
The main criticism against the validity of efficiency wages has been the so-
called "bonding critique" (Carmichael, 1985, 1987), according to which there
are more efficient mechanisms to solve the problem of asymmetric information,
as bonding, that should be preferred to wage premiums. Theoretical arguments,
casual observations and even anecdotal evidence have been offered in order to
support or dismiss whether these restrictions are actually the case. However,
as pointed out by Dickens, Katz and Lang (1985), efficiency wages cannot be
dismissed on a priory theoretical grounds and evidence is needed and therefore
the validity of efficiency wages is an issue that can only be resolved empirically.
Although, there is a vast number of empirical studies of efficiency wages,
there are many who view the evidence as unpersuasive and inconclusive (Man-
ning and Thomas, 1997; Autor, 2003). This is mainly due to numerous prob-
lems that render the empirical testing of efficiency wages particularly vexing.
Probably the majority of problems could be possibly summarized as related
to identification2 , arising mainly because efficiency wages are by definition en-
dogenous3 and arise under situations of asymmetric information which makes
it impossible for the econometrician to observe the outcomes of interest (as for
example worker’s productivity or type).
Out of the numerous empirical attempts to test some of the implications of
efficiency wages models, the most credible studies to date are those that find in-
genious ways to properly address the identification problem either by analysing
sample of firms in sectors where there is limited concern of unobserved hetero-
geneity (Cappelli and Chauvin, 1991; Krueger, 1991), or by exploiting natural
experiments (Groshen and Krueger, 1990; Holzer, Katz and Krueger, 1991;
1Under asymmetric information higher wages decrease shirking (Shapiro and Stiglitz,
1984), reduce quits and turnover costs (Salop, 1979), improve the quality of potential em-
ployees (Weiss, 1980) and workers’ association with the firm (Akerloff, 1982).
2This is mainly a problem of empirical studies based on observational data. In recent
years there has been also evidence produced by laboratory experiment providing some sup-
port to efficiency wages and in particular to the "gift-exchange" model (Fehr, Gachter and
Kirchsteiger, 1993, Fehr and Falk, 1999). However, the results of these experiments have been
challenged by more recent evidence (Gneezy and List, 2006) that fail to provide support to
the "fair wage-effort" hypothesis (at least in the long-run) and by the criticism related to the
extent that the behaviour of laboratory subjects can be a good indication of actual behavior
in labour markets.
3This simply means that wages cannot be used as a right-hand side variable in a regression
where the dependent variable is a proxy of employees’ productivity (Wadhwani and Wall,
1991; Konings and Walsh, 1994).
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Rebitzer, 1995). Most of these studies report evidence of a negative relation-
ship between higher wages and alternative means of regulating employees’ effort
(supervision) which is consistent with a prediction of the shirking model of ef-
ficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). This evidence can be viewed as
indirect evidence of positive wage effects on workers’ productivity.
The main criticism of the above studies has been that the evidence produced
is necessary but not sufficient for efficiency wages, as it is also consistent with
other explanations4 . The most important limitations of studies exploiting a
quasi-experimental design derives from its central innovation, i.e. the exploita-
tion of the unusual features of a specific labour market, as one cannot support
that the same results would be the case in another setting or labour market. De-
spite the limitations and criticism there are many who believe that this evidence
is as “good as it gets” (Autor, 2003).
As Rebitzer (1995) puts it “It is too early to know whether the theory
of efficiency wages will survive rigorous empirical investigation. The difficult
econometric problems such investigations confront make it unlikely that any
single study will settle the issue decisively. The empirical fate of efficiency wage
theory will more likely be determined by evidence from a variety of different
investigations-each having important limitations and qualifications.”
The purpose of this paper is to offer an investigation of the shirking model
by exploiting the link between efficiency wages and the minimum wage. Such
link can be justified firstly by the theoretical argument that a binding minimum
wage and other features of low-wage labour markets impose constraints in the
implementation of first-best contracts and thus open the door to efficiency wages
(Krueger, 1991; Georgiadis, 2006).
Another link is offered by the fact that efficiency wages models (Calvo and
Wellisz, 1979; Manning, 1995; Rebitzer and Taylor, 1995) have been deployed
to explain the striking evidence of a non-negative employment effect of the
minimum wage, produced by several empirical minimum wage studies since the
early 1990s (Card and Krueger, 1994, 1995).
Finally and probably most importantly the minimum wage satisfies the
above market-clearing property of the efficiency wage as it creates a wedge
between the wage at the current job and alternative wages5 and provides a
quasi-experimental design to study any effects of wages on worker’s productive
behaviour.
Our identification strategy is based on exploiting variation in wages gener-
4A positive relationship between productivity (effort) and wages could be also an implica-
tion of an equalising differences framework, under which employers who want their workers
to work harder should pay higher wages to compensate them for the disutility of effort. The
additional condition that sorts out efficiency wages from alternative explanations is that wages
are set optimally so that the cost of the wage is offset by an increase in revenue or a fall in
non-wage costs (Autor, 2003).
5Based on our theoretical model, although an economy-wide minimum wage raises also
alternative wages, it creates a wedge between compensation in current job and alternative
jobs, as in general equilibrium the imposition of a binding minimum wage reduces employment
and increases labour force participation and thus it reduces the probability of finding a job
elsewhere if one is caught shirking and being dismissed (Georgiadis, 2001, 2006).
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ated by the 1999 introduction of the UK National Minimum Wage (NMW) on
a sector of very low-wage firms, the residential care homes sector, to identify
the relationship between wages and monitoring and thus test for the wage-
supervision trade-off implication of the shirking model.
We find evidence that in care homes in which the NMW had larger impact
on the wage bill, monitoring, as measured by different ratios of senior to junior
employees fell by more, compared to homes that were less affected by the NMW.
Our estimates suggest that wage increases induced by the NMWwere on average
more than offset by a fall in monitoring costs. This latter finding is further
supported by evidence that the NMW had no effect on care homes profitability.
All the above evidence, combined with previous findings from the care homes
sector (Machin, Manning and Rahman, 2003) that employers didn’t increase
effort on the job and thus didn’t dissipate rents generated by the NMW, may
suggest that the NMW may have operated as an efficiency wage in the care
homes sector.
Overall, our paper not only provides a credible test of the shirking model,
but also offers an empirical test of efficiency wage models (Calvo and Wellisz,
1979; Manning, 1995; Rebitzer; 1995) developed to explain the evidence of a
non-negative minimum wage employment elasticity, which has been missing in
the literature.
In this way our study provides evidence which supports an efficiency wage
explanation of the recent findings from the care homes sector (Machin, Manning
and Rahman, 2003; Machin and Wilson; 2004), where although the wage struc-
ture was heavily affected by the NMW introduction there were only moderate
employment effects.
2 A Simple Model
In this section we extend the model of Rebitzer and Taylor6 (1995) which was
developed to explain the empirical findings of a non-negative minimum wage
employment elasticity, to account for endogenously determined supervision7 .
Consider a competitive industry with a large number of identical firms, where
the representative firm recruits a number of low-skilled, low-wage workers to
6Rebitzer and Taylor modified the Shapiro-Stiglitz model (1984) by treating the probability
of detecting a shirker as inversely related to the size of the workforce (in the Shapiro-Stiglitz
model the probability of detecting a shirker follows a poisson process) but assume that super-
visory capacity is fixed.
7Rebitzer and Taylor’s (RT) key result is a special prediction of a more general model
presented by Calvo and Wellisz (CW) (1979), a fact that has been neglected in the literature.
The two models differ only in terms of the returns to scale to production, as RT assume
decreasing and CW constant returns to scale. However, their results are the same qualitatively,
i.e. that a just binding minimum wage increases the employment of affected workers. By
relaxing the simplified assumption of fixed supervision in RT, Georgiadis (2001, 2006) shows
that the employment effect of a higher minimum wage cannot be positive although it can be
zero for a just binding minimum wage. Moreover, Georgiadis (2001, 2006) also shows that
the positive employment effect in CW hinges heavily on the assumption of constant returns
to scale and cannot be sustained if one assumes a decreasing returns production technology.
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produce a single product. Workers are homogeneous, infinitely lived and risk-
neutral with instantaneous utility function given by:
U(w, e) = w − e (1)
For a given wage offer, the worker must decide the level of effort he/she will
exert, which for simplicity is assumed to be binary, i.e. 0 if shirk and 1 if work.
e ∈ {0, 1} (2)
As in the Shapiro and Stiglitz )1984) model, the standard assumption here is
that effort is imperfectly observed and that the only device to prevent shirking
is the threat of dismissal8 . Some monitoring is needed in partial equilibrium so
that dismissal threats are non-empty, and this is why the firm employs super-
visors, for whom we assume that there are no shirking considerations9 .
The instantaneous probability of detecting a shirker is given by:
P =Min{
N
L
, 1} (3)
, where N and L is the number of supervisors and production workers respec-
tively10 .
In line with the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and Rebitzer and Taylor (1995)
we assume that workers who are caught shirking flow to unemployment and
receive an unemployment benefit µ, and that the probability of quitting, the
probability of finding a job and the discount rate are q, s and r respectively.
The present discounted value (p.d.v.) of expected lifetime utility of an un-
employed a worker, V w, can then be written as:
V w = w − e+
(1− q)V w + qV u
1 + r
(4)
, where V u is the p.d.v. of expected lifetime utility of an unemployed worker.
Similarly, the p.d.v. of expected lifetime utility of a shirker is given by:
V s = w +
(1− P )(1− q)V s + [1− (1− P )(1− q)]V u
1 + r
(5)
8First best motivation devices, as bonding, are ruled out because of capital market imper-
fections, moral hazard problems on the side of the employer or because of a binding minimum
wage (Weiss, 1991; Krueger, 1991).
9This is possible, if bonding can be implemented for supervisors but not for production
workers, which can be true if one thinks of supervisors as high-skilled, high-wage workers,
for whom the minimum wage does not prevent employers tilting optimally the wage-tenure
profile.
10We assume that 1 in equation (3) is never binding, otherwise the model specialises to the
standard one in the theory of the firm. Odiorne (1963) and Gordon (1990, 1994) suggest that
the supervisor to staff ratio is likely to be highly correlated with the extent of monitoring.
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Finally, the p.d.v. of expected lifetime utility of an unemployed worker V u,
is given by the following equation11 :
V u = µ+
sV w + (1− s)V u
1 + r
(6)
A worker will shirk unless the p.d.v. of expected lifetime utility of shirking
is less than or equal to that of working. This is expressed by the following
equation:
V w ≥ V S (7)
Combining (4), (5), (6) and (7) we obtain:
w ≥ µ+ e+
e(r + s+ q)
P (1− q)
(8)
Equation (8) is known as the non-shirking condition (NSC) (Shapiro and
Stiglitz, 1984), and expresses the set of all wages that prevent shirking for any
given value of e, µ, r, s, q and P . Under this setting it is rather intuitive that a
profit maximising firm will be willing to pay the lowest possible wage associated
with non-shirking. Using equation (3), (8) and the fact that the NSC is binding
in equilibrium we get equation (9).
w∗ = µ+ e+
e(r + s+ q)
N
L
(1− q)
(9)
Equation (9) implies the prediction of the standard shirking model that in
equilibrium there is a trade-off between wages and the probability of detection
as expressed by the supervisor to staff ratio N
L
. Equation (9) can be rearranged
to express monitoring intensity as a function of the optimal wage:
N
L
=
e(r + s+ q)
(w − µ− e)(1− q)
(10)
The introduction\increase of a minimum wage under this framework will
raise wages above alternative opportunities12 , which in turns increases the penalty
of shirking and thus worker’s propensity to shirk and this is why monitoring in-
tensity can be relaxed.
In general equilibrium, where all firms in the sector pay the minimum wage,
we need some unemployment to prevent shirking. As shown in Georgiadis
(2001), under this model a binding minimum wage decreases employment at
11We assume throughout that once a worker chooses to shirk he/she will always shirk and
will always work once he/she chooses to work.
12 In the model this is µ which stands for the unemployment benefit or value of leisure which
is equal to the market clearing wage.
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the firm level13 , which in general equilibrium leads to a reduction in the prob-
ability of finding a job s14 , leading to an equilibrium outcome under which all
employees are paid the minimum wage and do not shirk, but they are supervised
less stringently15 .
Equation (10) is the equation of interest for our empirical analysis in the
following sections.
3 Empirical Problems and Identification Strat-
egy
This section discusses the econometric problems that arise when one attempts
to estimate an empirical counterpart of equation (10), and the strategy we
implement in order to tackle them.
Empirical tests of the wage-supervision trade-off have been mainly hindered
by endogeneity arising from simultaneity, omitted variables and measurement
error (Groshen and Krueger, 1990, Rebitzer, 1995, Brunello, 1995).
Simultaneity arises because wages and supervision intensity are motivation
devices which are set optimally and simultaneously to minimise costs per effi-
ciency unit of labour (Georgiadis, 2001). Moreover, as suggested by Rebitzer
(1995), unobserved features of human resource policies that affect employees’
motivation (e.g. employee screening) will be also correlated with supervision in-
tensity and wages. The likely effect of failing to control for these factors will be
a positive omitted variable bias which masks any underlying trade-off between
wages and supervision (Leonard, 1987; Rebitzer, 1995).
Another concern in empirical studies of the trade-off arises by measurement
error in supervision intensity. This is because most studies use the ratio of
supervisors to supervised as a proxy for monitoring, which does not distinguish
between supervisors whose primary job is regulating the activities of lower level
employees and employees with supervisory job titles who nevertheless have a
direct role to play in production. Thus, the supervisor to supervised ratio tends
to overestimate the extent of monitoring (Kruse, 1992).
Moreover, the supervisors to staff ratio may be also problematic because
it is associated with the quantity of monitoring and not the quality (Brunello,
1995). However, measurement error seems to be more of a concern in these
studies, as they attempt to estimate an empirical analogue of equation (9),
13This result suggests that the prediction of Rebitzer and Taylor (1995) that binding min-
imum wage may have a positive employment effect is not robust when supervision is endo-
genised. The negative employment effect of the minimum wage is of second-order when the
minimum wage is set infinitesimally above the initial (efficiency) wage.
14The probability of finding a job is expected to fall even if employment is unchanged as a
result of the minimum wage imposition (this is the case in our model if the minimum wage is
set infitesimally above the initial optimal wage), as labour force participation is expected to
rise.
15This point suggests that the key prediction of the model of Rebitzer and Taylor that in
partial equilibrium a just binding minimum wage increases employment, is not robust under
general equilibrium.
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where supervision is a right-hand side variable and thus measurement error
leads to inconsistent estimates of the causal effect of interest. Alternatively,
if one estimates an equation with supervision as the dependent variable (as in
equation (10)) measurement error is less of a problem, although it leads to a
loss in precision16 .
Another potential source of upward bias in the wage-supervision relationship
may also arise because of labour demand adjustments, as an increase in the
wage of supervised staff may lead to an increase in the ratio of supervisors
to production workers, provided that the production function allows for some
substitution between the two inputs (Groshen and Krueger, 1990).
A final problem highlighted in the empirical literature of efficiency wages, is
that there are alternative theories that are consistent with a wage-supervision
trade-off (Kruse, 1992). One of these theories is the ”sorting by ability model”
(Groshen and Krueger, 1990), which it is predicated on the assumption that
more able employees are supervised less stringently because they need less co-
ordination and guidance on the job.
If low-ability workers are paid lower wages, then this model also generates a
prediction of the wage-supervision trade-off, as a cost-minimising firm will set
wages up to the point where the marginal benefit of a fall in wages and thus in the
average ability of workforce is exactly offset by the increase in supervision costs,
as lower average ability of workforce will demand more supervision. Empirically
this problem is translated to an omitted ability bias, which leads to a downward
bias in the estimate of the wage-supervision relationship.
Our empirical strategy is based on exploiting the exogenous variation in
wages generated by the 1999 introduction of the UK National Minimum Wage
NMW) in a very low-pay sector, the residential care homes industry. We es-
timate the causal effect of the change in the wage before and after the NMW
introduction on the change in supervision intensity implementing IV methods,
where measures of the impact of the NMW across homes are used as instruments
for the change in the wage.
In particular we are estimating the following system of equations:
∆Sit = β0 + β1∆lnWit + β2Ψi,t−1 + uit (11)
∆ lnWit = α0 + α1MINi,t−1 + α2Ψi,t−1 + vit (12)
,where ∆Sit is the change in the measure of supervisors to supervised ratio for
home i between the period before (t− 1) and after (t) the NMW introduction,
∆lnWit is the change in the natural logarithm of average hourly wage at home
i in the before and after NMW introduction period, MINi,t−1 is a measure of
the impact of the national minimum wage on home i (defined later), Ψi,t−1 is
(t− 1) level home and worker characteristics and uit and vit are error terms.
16This is true provided that the measurement error has zero mean and is uncorrelated
with the other regressors. Even in the case that the measurement error has no zero mean,
as we suggest that the supervisor to staff proxy systematically overestimates the extent of
monitoring, this only affects the estimation of the intercept (Wooldridge, 2002).
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The key parameter of interest is β1, which measures the relationship between
wage changes and the change in supervision intensity after controlling for other
factors such as home and workers’ characteristics.
Following closely Machin, Manning and Rahman (2003) we use two measures
of the impact of the UK NMW, the one is the proportion of workers at home
paid below their age specific NMW before the NMW introduction and the other
is the wage gap which is the proportional increase in the weekly wage bill if the
wages of all workers paid below the NMW before the NMW introduction are
raised at their age-specific NMW. The wage gap is defined as follows:
GAPi =
∑
j hjimax(W
min
ji −Wji, 0)∑
j hjiWji
(13)
,where hji is the weekly hours worked by worker j in firm i, Wji is the hourly
wage of worker j in firm i, and Wminji is the minimum wage relevant for worker
j in firm i (the adult rate or the development rate designed for those between
18 and 21 inclusive).
The empirical strategy described above, which is very similar to that em-
ployed by Machin, Manning and Rahman (2003), allows us to address the iden-
tification problem that compounds the estimation of the causal relationship
between wages and supervision in the literature. In particular, the NMW is
expected to be a valid and strong instrument for the change in the wage that
tackles any endogeneity problem due to simultaneity and omitted variables (in-
cluded omitted ability)17 .
Moreover, the nature of the data is such that limits problems of unobserved
heterogeneity, as the care homes sector is characterised by homogeneous occu-
pations and workers skills and homogeneous services. Unobserved heterogeneity
or omitted variables problems are further tackled by the fact that we observe
outcomes at two points in time (before and after the April 1999 NMW in-
troduction), which allows to use first differences specifications that control for
time-invariant unobserved factors that may affect the relationship of interest.
Measurement error as discussed above is expected to be less of a problem
compared to studies where supervision intensity is a causing variable. Moreover,
under the Classical Error in Variables (CEV) framework and if the measurement
error is additive and time-invariant18 , first differencing is expected to effectively
eliminate it.
Another concern, as pointed out previously, arises by labour demand ad-
justments which are expected to have an effect in the relative employment of
17This holds as long as variation in MINi,t−1 is not driven by variation in initial wages, as
the level of the NMW is the same for all regions, sectors and workers (given that they are in
the same category i.e. adults). Machin, Manning and Rahman (2003) test this identifying as-
sumption and provide evidence that supports its validity, i.e. that the relationship between the
change in the wages and initial wages has shifted in the period of the introduction compared to
a counterfactual period where no minimum wage was introduced.
18Measurement error in supervision intensity may be caused by omitted quality of supervi-
sion which may be related to time-invariant unobserved firm-specific characteristics as man-
agerial talent.
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supervisors and production workers. The direction of labour demand adjust-
ments depends on the assumptions about the production technology.
For example, if high-skilled supervisory workers and low-skilled production
employees are (gross) substitutes in production then we expect that as the
minimum wage renders the latter relatively more costful and optimal adjust-
ments will lead to an increase in the supervisor to staff ratio. In this case the
labour demand effect will counteract the efficiency wage effect, and thus evi-
dence supporting a negative relationship between wages and supervision makes
the negative effect even more compelling.
4 The Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data used in our analysis were collected by the Centre for Economic Perfor-
mance at LSE through postal surveys implemented before and after the April
1999 UK NMW introduction, as the main objective was to use the collected
information to evaluate the economic effects of minimum wages (see Machin,
Manning and Rahman, 2003 and Machin and Wilson, 2004, for details about
the survey design).
Questionnaires were addressed to home managers (who are often are the
home owners) asking question on home characteristics (ownership, whether
home is part of larger organisation, the number of registered beds, the num-
ber of residents, etc.). Most importantly managers were also asked to provide
data on job title, sex, age, length of service, possession of a nursing qualification,
weekly hours and weekly wages for all workers19 .
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the basic characteristics of homes
and of some measures of the intensity of supervision. The average home is small
in size (both in terms of the number of employees, or the number of beds or
residents), and the average hourly wage is quite low, around £4, suggesting
that the impact of the NMW introduction which was set at £3.6 per hour20 is
expected to be significant21 .
Other prevalent characteristics of the sector are that the vast majority of
employees are female (around 92% in both the full and the balanced sample),
the average employee age is around 40 years, that the principal occupation
is that of care assistants22 and that only one in ten employees has a nursing
qualification (the only relevant qualification/skill in the sector).
19Based on Machin et al. (2003) the sample of responding homes is representative of the
population of homes as a whole in terms of age, hours, job tenure and wages of workers.
20This is the adult rate, wth the development rate (the effective minimum wage for those
aged between 18 and 21 inclusive) set at £3. The adult rate is expected to be the main rate
applied as employees between 18-21 years old are a very small fraction of total employment
in the care homes sector and the evidence suggests that the development rate wasn’t used for
the majority of those people covered by the development rate (Metcalf, 2004).
21Machin et al (2003) and Machin and Wilson (2004) for present statistics of the "bite" of
the minimum wage which suggest that the impact of the NMW introduction is very heavy.
22This is one of the most important reasons of why wages are quite low in the sector as the
occupation of care assistants is among the lowest paid occupations in the UK (Machin et al.,
2003).
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The fact that the average home is small in size may suggest that monitoring
problems are not important as the manager/owner can easily monitor employ-
ees effort. However, the nature of the services provided by the care homes is
such that homes operate twenty four hours a day and seven days a week, which
makes it impossible for the owner to monitor employees effort. This is why all
managerial staff could be involved in monitoring the activities of employees in
lower ranks.
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Table 1: Survey Descriptive Statistics   
 
 
          All Firms     Balanced Panel 
 Pre- 
Minimum 
Post- 
Minimum 
Pre-
Minimum 
Post-
Minimum 
Number of Homes 1646 2366 683 683 
Number of Workers 17.51 
(19.78) 
17.63 
(23.61) 
16.15 
(9.69) 
16.65 
(12.09) 
Hourly Wage 4.04 
(0.85) 
4.24 
(0.81) 
4.01 
(0.8) 
4.27 
(0.8) 
Proportion Female 0.91 
(0.11) 
0.92 
(0.11) 
0.92 
(0.11) 
0.92 
(0.11) 
Average Age 40.25 
(6.6) 
40.52 
(6.8) 
40 
(6.45) 
40.58 
(6.8) 
Proportion Care 
Assistants 
0.62 
(0.26) 
0.61 
(0.27) 
0.62 
(0.26) 
0.63 
(0.26) 
Proportion With Nursing 
Qualification 
0.09 
(0.17) 
0.1 
(0.18) 
0.1 
(0.18) 
0.1 
(0.17) 
Number of Beds 26.54 
(83.56) 
25.29 
(68.29) 
18.68 
(18.02) 
19.26 
(19.45) 
Number of residents 22.74 
(71.67) 
22.28 
(60.27) 
16.55 
(17.34) 
17.12 
(18.4) 
Number of managers to 
number of non-managers 
0.13 
(0.3) 
0.14 
(0.37) 
0.14 
(0.35) 
0.13 
(0.29) 
Weekly hours of 
managers to weekly hours 
of non-managers 
0.27 
(1.03) 
0.29 
(1.02) 
0.29 
(1.02) 
0.27 
(0.75) 
Number of employees 
with nursing qualification 
to number of those with 
no qualification  
0.19 
(0.68) 
0.19 
(0.67) 
0.24 
(1.02) 
0.17 
(0.46) 
Weekly hours of 
employees with nursing 
qualification to weekly 
hours of those with no 
qualification 
0.27 
(1.34) 
0.25 
(0.99) 
0.39 
(2.01) 
0.22 
(0.71) 
Number of senior care 
assistants to number of 
junior care assistants 
0.29 
(0.61) 
0.28 
(0.54) 
0.28 
(0.52) 
0.28 
(0.47) 
Weekly hours of senior 
care assistants to weekly 
hours to junior care 
assistants 
0.42 
(1.4) 
0.39 
(1.06) 
0.36 
(0.71) 
0.37 
(0.65) 
 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Pre-minimum observations refer to responses received before April 
1999 and Post-minimum to responses received after March 1999. Care assistants include senior, day, and junior 
carers but exclude night carers and sleep-ins. 
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The distribution of the number of managerial employees across homes in
our sample, presented in figure 1, indicates that one third of homes in the
sample have no managerial employee in place, whereas one third has only one
managerial employee, and 40% of homes have more than 1 managers working
at home23 .
Figure 1: Sample distribution of the number of managerial employees across care 
homes 
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Thus, considering that in homes with managerial employees the one or two
managers working there on average are not expected to have only monitoring
responsibilities but also the fact that in a large proportion of care homes in
the sample there are no managerial employees, it is expected that other senior
employees, as senior care assistants and employees with nursing qualification
will be those responsible for checking the activities of less senior employees.
Table 1 indicates that there are around 8 non-managerial to every managerial
employee at home on average, whereas one qualified employee for every 5 non-
qualified and that to every hour of work of a senior carer correspond two hours
of a junior one. In our regressions, we use both bodies and hours measures of
the three supervision intensity ratios.
23As managers are defined employees with job title; manager/head of home, matron and
deputy matron, assistant manager and supervisor.
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5 Results
The first stage of our empirical strategy is to estimate equation (12) where the
main causing variable, the change in the log hourly wage, is regressed on the
instrument (the measure of the minimum wage). This is important, as checking
whether the NMW had any effect on the wage structure of the care homes sector
is a necessary condition in looking at the effects of any wage change, generated
by the NMW on other outcomes. Moreover, this first stage regression is a part
of the 2SLS estimation method and allows us also to check the strength of the
instrument.
Table 2: Home Level Wage Effects 
 
Change in log Hourly Wage 
Pre-
introduction 
NMW impact 
measure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Initial period 
low pay 
proportion 
0.15** 
   (0.015) 
0.15** 
   (0.015)   
Initial period 
wage gap   
    0.87** 
     (0.11) 
  0.9** 
      (0.12) 
Controls No Yes No Yes 
R2 0.14 0.19 0.23 0.3 
No. of 
observations 633 601 633 601 
 
**significant at 1%, robust s.e. in parentheses. Controls include: proportion female,average age, 
 proportion with nursing qualification, proportion of la/dss residents and county dummies.  
Table 2 presents regressions of change in the log hourly wage before and
after the 1999 NMW introduction on the two minimum wage impact measures
(the proportion of workers affected and the wage gap) using specifications that
include or not other controls for home and worker’s characteristics. The esti-
mates presented, which are in line with those presented by Machin et al (2003)
and Machin and Wilson (2004) suggest that the NMW generated a significant
boost in the average hourly wage across homes.
In particular, estimates that a workers in a care home that had 10% of
workers that were paid below their age-specific minimum, experienced a 1.5%
increase in the growth of average hourly wages relative to workers in a home
with no affected workers in their payroll. Alternatively, workers in a firm that
required 10% increase in its weekly wage bill to comply with the minimum
experienced a 9% increase in the average wage growth relative to workers in a
firm already paid at least the minimum.
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 Table 3: OLS versus 2SLS estimates of the relationship between the change in 
the wage and the change in the ratio of managerial employment to non-
managerial (bodies/hours) 
 
 Change in managerial to non-
managerial (bodies) 
Change in managerial to 
 non-managerial (hours) 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS 2SLSa 2SLSb OLS 2SLS 2SLSb 
Change in 
log average 
wage 
-0.193 
(0.138) 
 -0.862 
 (0.626)
  
 -0.623 
 (0.352)+
  
  -0.391 
  (0.594)
  
   -2.309 
   (2.183)
  
   -3.650 
   (2.660) 
 
Controls 
  Yes    Yes    Yes     Yes       Yes      Yes 
R-squared 
  0.23    0.07    0.16     0.15      0.08      0.11 
Number of 
Homes   584    584    584     567       567      567 
 
+significant at 10% (5% for a one-tailed test alternative), robust s.e. in parentheses. 2SLSa is using the 
proportion low-paid as an instrument for the change in the wage, and 2SLSb is using the wage gap  as 
an instrument for the change in the wage. Controls include proportion female, average age, proportion 
with nursing qualification, proportion of la/dss residents, county dummies, response-month dummies, 
whether part of larger organisation, ownership type, recruitment rate, quit rate, average tenure and the 
ratio of residents per employee.  
Thus, first-stage regression results suggest that there is no concern of a weak
instrument and overall, given that the NMW is introduced exogenously, that
both instruments are expected to be valid.
Table 3 presents estimation results of the structural equation (11), where
both OLS and 2SLS estimates, using separately each instrument are included,
and where the change in the ratio of managerial to non-managerial employment
(both in bodies and in hours) at home is used as the proxy for supervision
intensity.
Results seem to provide some weak support to the wage-monitoring trade-off
story, as a negative and significant (at 5% level for a one tail test alternative,
that the coefficient of the change in log hourly wage is negative) 2SLS estimate
is produced when the change in the managerial to non-managerial employees
is the supervision measure and the wage gap is used as an instrument for the
change in log hourly wages.
Comparing OLS and 2SLS estimates in table 3 suggests an upward OLS
bias, which is consistent with the efficiency wage/shirking model that wages and
supervision are substitutes in inducing employees productivity. As it is expected
2SLS estimates have higher standard errors than OLS which may be also due to
the presence of measurement error in supervision intensity as discussed in the
previous section.
In table 4 we present estimation results using the ratio of employment of
qualified and non-qualified employees, i.e. bodies and hours of employees with
nursing qualification relative to those with no nursing qualification. In this
case, there is some evidence of a significant negative effect (at 5% level for a
one tail test alternative, that the coefficient of the change in log hourly wage is
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negative) of the change in log hourly wage on the change in supervisory intensity
of employees with no nursing qualification both in bodies and hours. Again the
OLS bias seems to be uniformly positive.
Furthermore, estimation results presented in table 5, where monitoring in-
tensity is measured by the relative employment of senior to junior care assistants
again both in bodies and hours provide stronger support to the wage-supervision
trade-off prediction of the shirking model, as 2SLS estimates of the parameter
of interest are negative and more strongly significant (at 2.5% level for a one
tail test alternative, that the coefficient of the change in log hourly wage is
negative).
In particular, a significant negative effect of the change in log hourly wage
on relative employment of senior to junior care assistants is found when the
proportion of affected workers is used as an instrument and a similar effect on
relative employment of care assistants measured in hours when the wage gap
is the chosen instrument. Once more comparisons of OLS with 2SLS estimates
shows towards a positive bias in the coefficient of the change in hourly wage.
Table 4: OLS versus 2SLS estimates of the relationship between the change in 
the wage and the change in the ratio of employment of qualified to non-qualified 
(bodies/hours) 
 
 
Change in qualified to non-
qualified (bodies) 
Change in qualified to non- 
qualified (hours) 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS 2SLSa 2SLSb OLS 2SLSa 2SLSb 
Change in 
log average 
wage 
-0.067 
(0.185) 
  -0.285 
  (0.493) 
-0.593 
(0.330)+ 
  -0.280 
  (0.521) 
   -0.429 
   (0.940) 
   -1.969 
   (1.145)+ 
 
Controls     Yes     Yes   Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes 
R-
squared     0.31     0.31   0.31      0.27      0.27      0.26 
Number 
of Homes     550     550   550      545       545      545 
 
+significant at 10% (5% for a one-tailed test alternative), robust s.e. in parentheses. 2SLSa is using the 
proportion low-paid as an instrument for the change in the wage, and 2SLSb is using the wage gap  as 
an instrument for the change in the wage. Controls include proportion female, average age, proportion 
with nursing qualification, proportion of la/dss residents, county dummies, response-month dummies, 
whether part of larger organisation, ownership type, recruitment rate, quit rate, average tenure and the 
ratio of residents per employee.  
In particular, a significant negative effect of the change in log hourly wage
on relative employment of senior to junior care assistants is found when the
proportion of affected workers is used as an instrument and a similar effect on
relative employment of care assistants measured in hours when the wage gap
16
is the chosen instrument. Once more comparisons of OLS with 2SLS estimates
shows towards a positive bias in the coefficient of the change in hourly wage.
All in all we find some evidence of a negative effect of the change in the
wage generated by the NMW introduction in the supervision intensity of non-
managerial employees and employees with no nursing qualification and stronger
evidence that higher wages relax supervision for less senior care assistants which
seems to provide support to the prediction of the shirking model of a wage-
supervision trade-off. Additional upward bias due to potential substitution of
high-skilled employees with supervisory responsibilities for low-skilled super-
vised employees, and larger standard errors because of measurement error in
the dependent variable make our findings of the wage-supervision trade-off more
compelling.
Our findings that OLS estimates are uniformly positively biased across all
specification used compared to the 2SLS estimates provide further support to
the shirking model which predicts that omitted features of human resources and
personnel policy that are correlated with employees’ motivation/productivity
tend to mask any wage-supervision that may be in operation. On the other
hand a positive OLS bias is not consistent with the "sorting by ability model",
where omitted ability bias is predicted to be negative as more able employees
are paid higher wages and are supervised less stringently24 .
The latter evidence provides indirect support that higher wages are an em-
ployees’ motivation device, which is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
the shirking model to hold. This is because this condition is consistent with
principal-agent models many of which do not have the efficiency wage prop-
erty that the principal (employers) offers the agent (employees) a level of utility
strictly above what they could get on the open labour market (Manning and
Thomas, 1997).
Thus, for efficiency wages to hold, except of evidence of wage effects on work-
ers’ productivity, one needs to show also that employees are receiving rents, i.e.
that employers do not dissipate the rents generated by the NMW introduction
by deteriorating working conditions or increasing effort/intensity on the job,
and that any employees’ rents are set optimally so that the marginal cost of
rents is exactly offset by the marginal benefit.
As far as the condition of rent dissipation by employers is concerned, Machin
et al. (2003) report evidence that subjective effort and the intensity on the job,
as measured by the number of residents per employee didn’t change as a result of
the NMW introduction. This evidence, combined with the fact that there are no
fringe benefits or training provision in the care homes sector may be interpreted
as evidence that care homes employees in minimum wage jobs receive rents
by employers25 . Rents in current jobs relative to alternative opportunities are
24Note also that if one controls effectively for unobserved ability, then if the sorting by
ability model is true, the relationship between wages and supervision intensity should be
positive, which is not the case here. This is because higher wages enable the firm to increase
the average ability of the workforce and higher supervision to decrease it.
25Note that the existence of rents rules out, explanations of the wage-supervision trade-off,
based on equalising differences, according to which higher wages serve as compensation for
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justified by the fact that the NMW increases the opportunity cost of job search
or decreases the probability of finding a job as it is expected to increase labour
force participation. Alternatively, rents may result due to regional variation in
prices, and thus regional differences in the real value of the NMW across UK
regions.
Moreover, we fail to find any significant effects of the NMW on care homes
profitability26 , which may be possibly explained by the fact that the increased
costs induced by the NMW were offset by a fall in supervision costs. The
latter explanation becomes even more compelling if one considers that Machin,
Manning and Rahman (2003) failed to find evidence of other offsets, including
price offsets (as prices in the care homes sector were capped by local authorities
at the window of the NMW introduction), except of some moderate employment
effects.
Table 5: OLS versus 2SLS estimates of the relationship between the change in the 
wage and the change in the ratio of employment of senior carers to junior carers 
(bodies/hours) 
 
 
Change in senior cares to junior 
carers (bodies) 
Change in senior carers to junior 
carers (hours) 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS 2SLSa 2SLSb OLS 2SLSa 2SLSb 
Change in 
log average 
wage 
-0.103 
(0.155)  
 
  -1.199 
  (0.577)* 
-0.099 
(0.257) 
 
 
  -0.146 
  (0.282)
  
    -5.351 
    (3.836)
 
 
    -1.724 
    (0.775)* 
Controls     Yes     Yes  Yes      Yes       Yes        Yes 
R-squared     0.06     0.03  0.06      0.17       0.1        0.11 
Number 
of Homes     510     510  510       497      497        497 
 
* significant at 5% (2.5% for a one-tailed test alternative), robust s.e. in parentheses. 2SLSa is using the 
proportion low-paid as an instrument for the change in the wage, and 2SLSb is using the wage gap  as an 
instrument for the change in the wage. Controls include proportion female, average age, proportion with 
nursing qualification, proportion of la/dss residents, county dummies, response-month dummies, whether 
part of larger organisation, ownership type, recruitment rate, quit rate, average tenure and the ratio of 
residents per employee.  
 
Estimates of the wage supervision trade-off allow us to provide a test of
whether higher wages “paid for themselves” (Levine, 1992) using information
from the sample and comparing the marginal cost of higher wages to their
the disutility of the extra effort exerted by employees.
26Results of NMW effects on profitability are not reported here but they are available on
request. Machin and Wilson (2004) report evidence that the NMW had no effect on the exit
of firms in the sector, which seems to be consistent with an insignificant profit effect of the
NMW care homes sector, given that care homes operate in a competitive industry.
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marginal benefit27 . Our simple calculations suggest that the marginal benefit
more than offset the marginal cost of the higher wage28 .
However, one should be very cautious in interpreting these results as sup-
porting a motivation/efficiency-enhancing effect of the higher wage, as it may
be the case that a decrease in the ratio of senior to junior carers may reflect
a fall in the quality of care, as there are less senior (qualified) employees to
support care homes residents after the NMW introduction. In order to test this
hypothesis we estimate reduced form equations in which the dependent variable
is the change in hours of senior carers per resident and hours of employees with
nursing qualification per resident between the period before and after the NMW
introduction29 .
The results presented in table 6 suggest no significant effect of the NMW on
the number or hours of senior carers and employees with nursing qualification per
resident, and thus no indication of a fall in the quality provided by care homes.
The latter finding combined with the results indicating a fall in the number
of senior carers implies a fall in the actual number of residents in the average
home in the sector. This is evidence suggesting a contraction in the volume
of services (output) which seems no surprising given the moderate reduction in
employment in the sector.
Overall, our findings presented in this section seem to support the wage-
supervision trade-off prediction of the shirking model which can be interpreted
as providing indirect evidence of productivity-enhancing effects of higher wages.
Combining the latter evidence with other findings from the care homes sector
that employers didn’t dissipate rents generated by the NMW introduction by
increasing effort on the job and that there was no significant profit effects of
higher wages may suggest that the NMW operated as an efficiency wage in the
care homes sector.
Thus, this evidence may provide a potential explanation of recent findings
that although the wage structure in the sector was heavily affected by the NMW
there were only moderate employment effects, which further provides empirical
support to efficiency wages models of the minimum wage literature (Calvo and
27Etimated results from table 5 suggest that a 1% increase in the average wages at home
resulted in 1.2 less senior carer per junior care or 1.7 less hours of senior carers per hour of
junior carer. The marginal cost of higher wages is calculated as 1% increase in the average wage
of supervised employees (junior carers) and the benefit of the wage is the fall in supervision
costs generated by the fall in the number (hours) of senior carers per (hour of) junior carer.
28The marginal cost of the wage in this particular case is 1% ∗$3.8 = $0.038, which is the
average wage of junior carers in the sample, i.e. 3.8 pence per hour per junior carer. The
marginal benefit based on both estimates of the trade-off (in bodies and in hours) is the same,
i.e. 1.2
0.28
∗ $4.28
100
= $0.18 , and 1.7
0.4
∗ $4.28
100
= $0.18, 18 pence per hour of junior carer where
0.28 is the average ratio of the number of senior to junior carers in the sample, 0.4 is the
average ratio of hours of senior to junior carers and $4.25 is the hourly wage of senior carers.
Note however that these calculations may be somewhat imprecise due to imprecision in the
estimation results.
29The number of hours of carer/nurse per resident seems a better proxy for the quality
of care than the actual number of carers/nurses per resident. Nevertheless, we found no
significant effect of the NMW on the quality of care when the bodies-based measure was used
as the dependent variable.
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Wellisz, 1979; Manning, 1995; Rebitzer, 1995).
Table 6: Reduced form estimates of quality of care adjustments 
 
 Change in hours of senior carers per 
resident 
Change in hours of qualified per 
resident 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
%Low-paid -0.67 
(0.51) 
 -1.03 
(0.52) 
-0.75 
(0.74) 
Wage- gap  -3.39 
(2.38) 
  
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.27 
Number of 
homes 
629 629 622 622 
 
* significant at 5%, robust s.e. in parentheses. Controls include proportion female, average age, proportion 
with nursing qualification, proportion of la/dss residents, and county dummies.  
6 Conclusions
Efficiency wages cannot be dismissed on a priory theoretical grounds and evi-
dence is needed. The large number of empirical studies in the field, except of
some few credible attempts, hasn’t produced persuasive or conclusive evidence
mainly due to empirical problems that render the empirical investigation of ef-
ficiency wages particularly vexing. Thus, more credible empirical studies are
needed in order to decide the fate of efficiency wages theory.
In this paper, we exploit the ideal research design provided by the UK NMW
introduction in a very low-pay sector, the residential care homes in order to over-
come any identification problems associated with testing the wage-supervision
trade-off prediction of the shirking model. The NMW introduction except of
generating exogenous variation in care homes wages, provides also rents to em-
ployees in minimum wage jobs, as it increases the opportunity cost of job search
and forms a wedge between the wage received at the current job and expected
alternative job opportunities, which is the defining property of efficiency wages.
We find some weak evidence supporting a wage-supervision trade-off for
non-managerial employees and for employees with no nursing qualification and
strong evidence in favour of a trade-off for care assistants which is the principal
occupation in the sector. This evidence should be interpreted as supporting the
tenet of the shirking model that higher wages and supervision are substitutes
in eliciting effort by employees, and thus as indirect evidence of productivity
enhancing effects of higher wages.
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The latter findings combined also with evidence that employers didn’t dissi-
pate wage rents by increasing job intensity and that higher wages didn’t seem
to have a negative effects on profits, may suggest that the NMW may have
operated as an efficiency wage in the care homes sector, which also explains
the recent findings of moderate (negative) employment effects in the sector as a
result of the NMW introduction. Our analysis also provides a direct test that
supports efficiency wages models developed to explain empirical findings of a
non-negative employment effect of the minimum wage.
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